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1.    Introduction 
  When asked for investment advice at cocktail parties, most finance professors hesitantly 
recommend a well-diversified index fund, such as one that tracks the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
500 Index of blue chip shares.   This advice may have been far sounder than its propagators ever 
imagined.    
  The view that investors should entrust their savings to a well-diversified index fund 
follows from the semi-strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), which states that 
no publicly available information is useful in predicting stock returns.  Despite a large literature 
on market anomalies, behavioral studies of investors, and the like, the hypothesis that the market 
is semi-strong form efficient retains its place of prominence in introductory finance textbooks, 
for studies critical of it have yet to coalesce into a coherent alternative framework.    
  If the semi-strong form of the EMH is valid, and it is impossible to pick stocks that will 
perform better than average on a risk adjusted basis, the optimal investment strategy is to keep 
transactions costs low and remain widely diversified.  Index funds generally accomplish these 
two goals better than other investment channels available to typical cocktail party guests.   
  Increasingly, even big institutional investors ‘index’ large and growing fractions of their 
portfolios.  That is, they relegate large and growing pools of money to ‘passive’ investment 
strategies, such as buying and holding the stocks in the S&P 500 Index.  The growing importance 
of indexing makes an understanding of its economic consequences an important question. 
  There is now considerable evidence that the demand curves of stocks in important 
indexes, such as the S&P 500, slope down.  Shleifer (1986) finds that a company’s stock price 
rises significantly on the news that it will be added to the S&P 500, and argues that this value 
increase is permanent.  Shleifer concludes that stocks, like ordinary economic goods, have   2
downward sloping demand curves and that share purchases by index funds constitute outward 
shifts in these demand that generate the price increases he observes.    
  Although Shleifer contends that the price increases he detects are permanent, the power 
of long-term abnormal return tests is weak and subsequent evidence on this point has been 
mixed. In this paper, we argue that if the increased value associated with inclusion in the S&P 
index is indeed permanent, it should be detectable in average Tobin’s q ratios.   
  We find that membership in the S&P 500 index is associated with significantly higher 
valuation, measured by average Tobin’s q ratios, even after controlling for standard variables 
known to affect q ratios.  This finding is highly robust, and the S&P 500 membership value 
premium rises steadily from 1978 to 1997 in step with the growth of indexing.  Granger causality 
tests suggest that being in the index causes the value premium; and that, while it cannot be 
rejected in some specifications, reverse causation is less statistically important.  
  One interpretation of this finding is that there is a presently unknown intangible asset 
associated with membership in the S&P 500 that has grow steadily more valuable over time and 
that assets manifests in share value premiums when (or after) the shares are included in the 
index.   
  Another interpretation is that the demand curves of stocks in the S&P 500 index slope do 
slope downward, and that the increased demand associated with increased ‘passive’ investment 
has had the fortuitous effect of pushing up the prices of S&P 500 stocks relative to those of other 
similar firms, justifying that investment strategy.   
  We argue that the second explanation may be the more plausible one, and that the 
cocktail party advice, which adherents to the efficient markets hypothesis have promulgated,   3
may have had the perverse effect of undermining the efficiency of the stock market.   
Nonetheless, it turned out to be very good advice. 
 
1.1    Share Value Effects Associated with Index Membership 
  The basic finding of Shleifer (1986) is that, when a firm is added to the S&P 500 index 
between 1976 and 1983, its stock price rises by 2.79 percent.  Shleifer argues that this increase is 
both permanent and unrelated to any change in the fundamental value of the stock.   
Consequently, Shleifer (1986, 2000) argues that this finding implies that the demand curves for 
stocks in the index slope downward.   
  This interpretation is illustrated in Figure 1.  When a stock is added to a widely tracked 
index, the added demand by passive investors shifts its demand curve to shift out, from D to D1.  
This causes its price to rise from P to P1, generating the abnormal return Shleifer (1985) 
documents.   
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
  As Scholes (1972) and Shleifer (2000) point out, the demand curve for any good is flat if 
it has perfect substitutes that are in unlimited totally elastic supply.  The assumption that 
financial assets have infinitely many such perfect substitutes underlies most asset pricing models, 
in that they assume the demand for an asset to depend only on its expected return and risk.  Any 
other asset, or combination of assets, with the same expected return and risk is a perfect 
substitute that can be arbitraged infinitely against the asset in question.  It is therefore not 
surprising that Shleifer’s (1986) interpretation of his findings has been controversial.     4
  Harris and Gurel (1986) challenge Shleifer’s first contention that the effect is permanent.  
They argue that purchases by index funds create only a temporary spike in demand for the newly 
included stock because potential sellers do not respond immediately.  In their view, this delay 
causes a temporary price increase that is soon reversed.  They use index inclusions from 1978 
through 1983 to demonstrate an announcement date abnormal return of 3.13 percent and, 
critically, an offsetting -2.49 percent cumulative abnormal return of over the subsequent 29 
trading days.  They thus cannot reject a complete reversal.  In contrast, Beneish and Whaley 
(1996) and Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) find only partial reversals in the event windows they 
study.   
  However, Jain (1987) and Dhillon and Johnson (1991) replicate Shleifer’s (1986) finding 
rejecting a complete reversal. Dhillon and Johnson (1991) also show that the prices of call 
options on newly included stocks increase on the announcement date.  Since corresponding put 
prices do not rise, these increases are not caused by increased implied volatility.  Taken together, 
these findings indicate options markets expect the stock price increase to last - at least past the 
maturity of the options.   
  Kaul et al. (2000) study a rejigging of the weights of companies in the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSE) 300 index, which is tracked by Canadian index funds.  The index weights of 
some companies rose, while those of others fell, and their share prices rose or fell in proportion 
when the rejigging was implemented.  Kaul et al. reject a complete reversal until long after 
trading volume and spreads have returned to normal.  Their tests lose power over very long 
horizons, but their point estimates suggest that the abnormal returns are not reversed. 
  In summary, Shleifer’s (1986) inference that the abnormal returns he detects are largely 
permanent remains subject to debate, though more recent evidence tends to support his initial   5
view.   In this study, we test for a statistically significant value premium in the abnormal average 
Tobin’s q ratios of S&P 500 firms relative to those of other similar firms.  We argue that the 
effect detected by Shleifer and others is indeed permanent because we detect an unambiguous q 
ratio premium in S&P 500 firms in cross-sectional regressions. 
  Shleifer’s (1986) second contention that inclusion in the S&P index is unrelated to any 
revision in investors’ estimate of the stocks’ fundamental values is also controversial.  Dhillon 
and Johnson (1991) show that included firms’ bond prices rise in step with their stock prices, and 
Jain (1987) finds abnormal returns for inclusions into industry indexes that are not used as 
passive investment benchmarks.  These authors suggest that inclusion in the index amounts to a 
“certification of quality”, and that this is the ultimate cause of the value increase.  Since Standard 
and Poor’s rates bonds as its core business, such a certification effect would seem plausible.   
  However, more recent studies support Shleifer’s original interpretation. First, Wurgler 
and Zhuravskaya (2000) find that the abnormal returns associated with inclusion in the S&P 500 
are larger for stocks that are less likely to have close substitutes.  Second, the Kaul et al. (2000) 
result is clearly not due to a certification effect as the event studied is a mechanical 
rearrangement of the weights of stocks already in a widely followed index.  Since no new stocks 
were added to the index, a certification effect can be ruled out categorically.   
  Thus, Shleifer’s (1986) second contention, that the effect is unrelated to any change in the 
included stock’s fundamental value, is also controversial, but again, more recent studies tend to 
confirm his interpretation of his finding.  In this study, we argue that Shleifer’s contention of an 
outward shift in demand caused by index funds holdings is plausible because the q ratio premium 
for S&P 500 member firms rises over time, in step with the rising popularity of indexing.   
   6
2.    Empirical Framework 
Our empirical analysis compares the actual market value of firm j in year t, Vt,j, with an 
estimate of that value based on a vector of reported financial data, xj,t.  Thus, we consider 
 
[1]   j t j t t j t f V , , , ) ( ε + = x . 
 
If we find that firms in the S&P Index consistently have market values higher than those we 
predict, we can conclude that S&P membership is associated with higher market value.  That is, 
we interpret a positive εt,j as indicating a high market value.  We postulate that xt,j should include 
a variable representing membership in the S&P 500 index 
  As a first approximation, we assume the functional form 
 
[2]  ) ( ) ( , , 4 , , 3 , , 2 , , 1 , , 0 , j t t j t t j t t j t t j t t j t t A n debt adv rd A f β β β β β + + + + = x . 
  
That is, we assume firm j’s market value to be proportional to the replacement cost of its tangible 
assets, At,j, plus an additional effect associated with possession of proprietary technology, which 
we assume proportional to research and development spending, rdt,j, and another effect 
associated with the possession of brand names and the like, which we take to be proportional to 
advertising spending, advt,j.  We allow for a possible effect on value of leverage, debtt,j, and also 
allow for a nonlinear relationship of market value to tangible assets replacement cost by 
including an effect proportional to some function n(At,j).  
We thus consider 
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It is plausible that the value of β0,t might differ across industries. Typical firms in 
industries where certain sorts of intangible assets are important, such as newspapers, where 
subscriber lists are a key asset, might have a much higher market value per dollar of tangible 
replacement cost than would firms in industries such as cement manufacturing, where tangible 
assets account for most of firms’ market values.   This line of reasoning suggests that we replace 
β0,tAt,j in [3] with  j t j i t
I
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and the γi,t are a vector of 3-digit SIC code industry-specific estimated coefficients. 
  Heteroskedasticity problems make the estimation of [3] by least squares problematic 
because both positive and negative valuation errors are likely to be larger for larger firms.  That 
is, εt,j is likely to be proportional to measures of firm size, such as At,j.  Since least squares 
estimation techniques place greater weight on more extreme observations, direct estimation of 
[3] risks ignoring smaller firms.  To remedy this, we divide through [3] by At,j to get 
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is plausibly independently and identically distributed (iid) across firms within each time period.  
Note that the dependent variable in [5] is equal to firm j’s average q ratio in year t.   
  Our objective is to test for a valuation effect associated with S&P 500 index membership 
in each year.  We therefore expect ζt,j to be larger for firms that are in the index.  That is, we 
expect that  
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and ut,j is an iid error.   
Our empirical framework is thus to estimate the regression 
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cross-sectionally in each time period t.  We test directly for a valuation effect by testing the 
statistical and economic significance of β5,t and observing how the value and significance of this 
coefficient change over time.   
  The S&P 500 index is value-weighted, so some firms make up greater parts of the index 
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Our second empirical test is therefore to run the regression  
 































, 1 , , 1 ,
,
, ) ln( + + + + + + =∑ = β β β β β δ γ  
 
cross-sectionally in each time period t and again to note the statistical and economic significance 
of β5,t.   
  To test whether index membership causes higher firm values or higher firm value causes 
index membership, we supplement this regression analysis with some simple Granger causality 
tests (see Granger, 1969; Sims, 1972).  We detrend the coefficient from (9) and (11) by taking 
either first differences or first differences of logarithms (rates of growth). Durbin-Watson 
statistics reject the hypotheses that the detrended series are autocorrelated.  
To test the hypothesis that indexing ‘causes’ a valuation premium for stocks in the index, 
we then regress    10
[12]  t
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whereβ τ 5,  now represents the detrended coefficient from either (9) or (11), xt is now the 
detrended amount of money indexes to the S&P 500 Index in year t, and zt is a roughly iid error.  
That is, we regress the measures of the detrended S&P500 value premium on lagged values of 
itself and on current and on the detrended value of funds indexed to the S&P500. 
We then run the restricted regression  
[13]  t
L
z z t z t υ β ϑ θ β ∑ = − + + =
1 , 5 0 , 5  
without current and past values of xt.  
  We test the joint significance of {κ1, … κL} by testing whether the sum of squared 
residuals of the restricted regression is significantly larger than that of the corresponding 
unrestricted regression. If the difference in sums of squared residuals is statistically significant, 
we concluded that indexing ‘Granger-causes’ the valuation premium (or, changes in indexing 
Granger-cause changes in the valuation premium).  
To compare the sum of squared errors of the restricted regression [13], denoted SSE(u) 
with that of the unrestricted regression [12], denoted SSE(r), we employ the statistic 
[14]  s
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which has an F distribution with one and n – 2L – 1 degrees of freedom, where L is the number 
of lags and n the number of observations.  An alternative approach is to use the statistic 
[15]  s






which has a χ
2 distribution with n degrees of freedom.     11
   We then test for reverse causality by switching the dependent and independent variables 
in [12] and [13], and repeating the whole procedure.  
  We find that β5 grows steadily in magnitude through our sample period from 1978 to 
1997, and that this growth roughly tracks the growth in S&P 500 indexing.  Our Granger 
causality tests are more consistent with the view that growth in the amount of money indexed to 
the S&P 500 index causes the increased valuation effect associated with index membership or 
index weight than with the reverse.    
 
3.    Construction of Data Sample and Key Variables 
This section is a technical explanation of the construction of our data sample and key 
variables. 
 
3.1    Data Sample 
Our basic sample begins with all firms listed in Compustat in the twenty-year panel from 
1978 to 1997.  We do not include firms in banking and financial industries  - Standard Industrial 
Classification (S.I.C.) codes 6,000 through 6,999 – as accounting information for these firms is 
not comparable to that of other firms. We delete observations in which sales, the share price, the 
number of shares outstanding, inventories, or property plant and equipment (PPE) are missing or 
negative.  Where these variables are present, but entries for research and development spending, 
advertising spending, short term debt, long term debt, or non-inventory short-term assets are 
missing, the missing variables are assumed to be nil.   We call the resulting firm-year 
observations our basic sample.   12
We define a company as being in the S&P 500 Index in year t if it is in the index on 
December 31 of that year.  To construct the list of S&P 500 members for each year, we begin 
with the current year’s list of members and work backwards, adjusting the list for firms dropped 
from and added to the index each year.
1  We double-check the resulting sequence of lists by 
purchasing from Standard and Poor’s Corporation its S&P 500 membership list for 1982, the 
earliest year for which such data are available.  Where discrepancies were found, they were 
corrected using newspaper records.  This procedure generates our index firms sample for each 
year.   
The first column in Table 1 lists the number of S&P500 index firms we use each year.  
The number is less than 500 because some firms in the index are financial firms, and so are 
excluded from our basic sample.    We refer to this index subsample as I1.  
We wish to contrast S&P 500 index member firms against other comparable firms.  We 
do this in two ways: by using a multiple regression framework across a broad sample of non-
S&P500 firms and by constructing subsamples of matched pair firms.    
The second column of Table one lists the number of firms in the basic sample each year 
that are not members of the S&P 500 index and that are at least as large as the smallest S&P 500 
firm that year.  Size is measured as estimated replacement cost, the construction of which 
variable is described below.  This subsample, denoted C, we call our control subsample.  We do 
not include firms smaller than the smallest S&P500 index firm for a specific year on the grounds 
that very small firms may not be valued by investors in the same way as larger firms. This 
subsample contains some extreme observations, which probably reflect coding errors by 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Jeff Wurgler for providing us with index additions and deletions data.     13
Compustat.
2  We therefore winsorize the data at the first and 99
th percentiles for all important 
variables. 
The third and fourth columns in Table 1 list the number of S&P firms for which industry 
and size matched pair firms are available.  We select matching firms for each index firm as 
follows.  We define our match candidate sample as our basic sample less S&P index firms.  For 
each year, we first match each index firm with a list of all candidate sample firms having the 
same primary three-digit industry code.  We then rank each potential match by the percentage 
difference between its replacement cost and that of the index firm in question.  The potential 
matching firm closest to the index firm by this metric is then chosen as the industry and size 
matched firm corresponding to that index firm.  If there are several index firms in the same 
industry, we match the smallest firm first, then delete its match from the candidate sample, and 
then match the next smallest firm. This process insures that each S&P index firm has a unique 
industry and size matching control firm.   In some cases, the number of index firms in an 
industry exceeds the number of candidate firms.  If this occurs, several S&P firms are paired 
with the same control firm. The control firm observation only appears once, so the match index 
subsample, denoted M1, may be smaller than I in some years.  
   Some of the matched pairs of index and control firms in I and M1 are not terribly close 
matches.  We therefore delete match pairs where the difference in replacement cost between the 
index firm and its match is greater than half that of the index firm.  The remaining samples or 
                                                 
2 We checked a randomly selected ten extreme observations in the ratios displayed in Table 2 by 
comparing Compustat figures to printed annual reports.  Of these, 7 observations or 70%, reflect 
coding errors by Compustat, such as misplaced decimal points.  A similar check of ten 
observations from the central parts of the distributions characterized in Table 2 found no coding 
errors.  We therefore correct the 7 erroneous observations and then winsorize the resulting 
sample at the first and 99
th percentiles on the grounds that tail observations contain a 
disproportionately high fraction of coding errors.    14
S&P 500 firms and matched firms, denoted I2 and M2 respectively, we call our close match index 
subsample and close match controls subsamples.   
We run our regressions first on the subsample of index firms and control firms at least as 
large as the smallest index firm that year.  We then repeat our regressions on the matched pairs 
of index and control firms.  Finally we re-estimate our regressions using the close match pairs 
only.  union of our index firms sample and matched firms sample.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
3.2    Construction of Key Variables 
Our key variables are constructed from Compustat data.  In using this data, it is necessary 
to adjust for Compustat’s fiscal year-end convention.  Compustat defines the data from fiscal 
years ending between June 1 of year t-1 and May 31 of year t as ‘year t data’.  We redefine the 
data so that year t data is the data from the fiscal year that ended during the calendar year t.   This 
adjustment is necessary, since we wish to explain variables constructed from calendar year-end 
share prices with accounting data, and do not wish to use future information to predict the past.   
Unless otherwise indicated, all data are in current dollars. 
    Table 2 displays simple univariate statistics for these variables, whose construction we 
now describe in detail in the remainder of this section - which can be omitted by the reader 
without loss of continuity. 
 
[Table 2 about here]   
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Market Value  
  The market value of a firm is essentially a marking to market of all the components of the 
liabilities and net worth side of it’s balance sheet.  We take the market value, Vt,j, of firm j at time 
t to be the market value of all outstanding equity plus the market value of all outstanding debts.  
This subsection describes in detail the construction of each of these components of Vt,j. 
  First, we take the market value of common stock, Vcs,t,j, to be the price per share on 
December 31 times the number of shares outstanding.
3  The market value of preferred shares, 
Vps,t,j, is the net number of preferred shares outstanding in the event of involuntary liquidation 
multiplied by their per share involuntary liquidating value.
4  Data to construct both Vcs,t,j and 
Vps,t,j are taken from Compustat. 
  Second, market value of net short-term debts, Vsd,t,j, is assumed equal to their book value. 
Since their short durations render the market and book values similar for short-term liabilities 
and most short-term assets, we take them at book value.
 5   
  Third, we estimate the market value of long-term debt as 
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where Bld,t,j is the book value of the firm’s long-term debts at the end of year t, fa,t,j is the fraction 
of firm j’s long-term debt that is a years old as of year t, and rt is average Moody’s BAA bond 
                                                 
3 Compustat item 24 times item 25.   
4 Compustat item 10. 
5 Compustat item 34.   16
rate for year t.
6  We thus take the difference between the book value of the firm’s long-term 
debts in year t-a and year t-a-1 to be the book value of it’s a-year-old debt. The book value of 
vintage a debt is multiplied by the market value of BAA debt of that age per dollar of book 
value, estimated using the standard formula for the price of 20-year debt issued at par a years 
ago.   
  We are thus simplifying by assuming all debt to be 20-year BAA coupon bonds issued at 
par and that the current BAA rate is an appropriate discount rate for pricing future coupons and 
final debt payments.  We are also ignoring call features, security, and other factors that can cause 
bond prices to deviate from the simple coupon bond formula.  Thus, bond prices are year-
specific, but not firm-specific.   
   Long-term debt with one year to maturity is treated as short-term debt.  We take the 
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In some cases, it is not possible to obtain precise values for the book values of long-term 
debt in all 19 previous years.  We therefore use an estimated debt age structure based on the 
aggregate fractional debt age structure across all firms in Compustat in that year.  To do this, we 
sum the book values of long-term debt outstanding for all Compustat firms in each year and then 
take differences between the sums for each pair of successive years to construct an aggregate 
long-term debt age profile.  We divide the components of each 19-year-long age profile by the 
total long-term debt outstanding in the 20
th year to get an average fractional age structure for 
long-term debt in each year.  Thus, we take 
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Thus, if the values of fj,a,t are missing for a < a0, we renormalize the corresponding fa,t for the 
missing debt vintages to obtain approximations for the missing fractions using 
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  Finally, we take the market value, Vt,j, of firm j at time t to be the sum of the market 
values of common and preferred equity, net short-term liabilities, and long-term debts,  
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Replacement Cost 
  The replacement cost of a firm’s tangible assets is essentially a marking to market of all 
the entries on the assets side of its balance sheet.  Ideally, we would estimate a firm’s 
replacement cost by making a detailed list of all the firm’s individual assets and obtaining a 
value for each from second-hand capital goods markets. In practice, this is not possible because 
firms’ asset accounts are not sufficiently detailed and because appropriate second-hand capital 
goods markets prices are often not available.  Moreover, many of the assets that make up a 
typical firm are industry-specific.  Others, such as proprietary technology or reputation are   18
intangible, and are missing from conventional accounting balance sheets.  Because of these 
complications, we begin by estimating the part of replacement cost that can be estimated with a 
degree of confidence, and then consider a series of control variables that are plausibly related to 
these missing components of true replacement cost.   
  We begin by taking the replacement cost of firm j’s tangible assets at time t, At,j, to be the 
sum of the market values of its property, plant and equipment (PP&E), Appe,t,j, inventories, Ainv,t,j, 
‘other assets’, Aoa,t,j and net current asset Anca,t,j.   This subsection describes in detail the 
construction of each of these components of At,j. 
 To  estimate  Appe,t,j, we begin with the book value of firm j’s net PP&E in year t, denoted 
Bppe,t,j.
7  The Appe,t,j are estimated as 
 
[21] 
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where  t p ˆ  is a capital goods price index (the fixed non-residential investments GDP deflator) and 
at,j is the average age of firm j’s PP&E in year t.   
















                                                 
7 Compustat item 8.   19
where 
G
j t ppe B , , and Dt,j are the ‘gross value of PP&E’ and ‘income statement depreciation’ of firm 
j as reported for the fiscal year ending in year t.
8  While at,j ≥19, at,j = 19, and if at,j ≤0, at,j = 0. 
 To  estimate  Ainv,t,j, the value of firm j’s inventories in time t, we follow different 
procedures depending on the inventory accounting method used by the firm.
9  If the firm reports 
inventories using the ‘first in first out’ (FIFO) method, the book value of inventories is likely to 
be close to the market value, and no adjustment in necessary.  If the firm uses ‘last in first out’ 
(LIFO) accounting, the book value of inventories is based on old prices, and may thus deviate 
from market value – especially during and after periods of high inflation.   
  Accordingly, the reported inventories value for firms using LIFO, Binv,t,j, is adjusted 
recursively as 
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where pt is PPI deflator for year t.
10   The market value of inventories is taken as equal to the 
book value in the first year in which the firms is listed in Compustat.   
  Some firms use several inventory accounting methods.  For these firms, Compustat ranks 
the methods in order of importance.  We use the rules of thumb described in Table 3 to apply 
[17] to fractions of these firms’ inventories. 
                                                 
8 
G
j t ppe B , ,  is Compustat item 7. 
9 Firms’ inventory accounting methods are from Compustat item 59.   20
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Thus, each year, we apply the recursive formula [17] to the fraction of the firm’s 
inventories listed in the third column of Table 2, and assume the market value of the remainder 
of the firm’s inventories to equal their book value.   
 To  estimate  Aoa,t,j, the market value of ‘other assets’, we consider reported ‘investments in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries’, ‘other investments’, and ‘investments in intangibles’.
11 Since these 
assets are carried at historical cost, their book values may understate their true replacement costs. 
We therefore adjust these book values using a recursive procedure identical to that described for 
LIFO inventories in [17]. The only difference is that the deflator in calculating Aoa,t,j is the fixed 
non-residential investment GDP deflator instead of PPI deflator in the Ainv, formula. 
  The last component of tangible replacement cost is ‘net current assets’, Anca,t,j, (net of 
inventories, which  are adjusted to market above).  Remaining current assets include ‘cash & 
short term investments’, ‘receivables’, and ‘other current assets’. Since these assets are quite 
liquid, their book values are reasonable estimates of their market values.  We thus value ‘net 
current assets’ at the total book value of current asset minus the total book value of inventories.
12   
  Finally, we take the tangible assets replacement cost of firm j at time t, At,j, as the sum of 
the estimated replacement costs of PP&E, inventories and ‘other assets’,  
 
  [24]  j t nca j t oa j t inv j t ppe j t A A A A A , , , , , , , , , + + + ≡  
                                                                                                                                                             
10 Binv,t,j is Compustat item 3. 
11 Compustat items 31, 32 and 33 respectively. 
12 Compustat item4 minus item 3.   21
 
Note that At,j is expressed in 1982 dollars.   
 
Tobin’s Average q Ratio 
  In this analysis, we are interested in the total market values of firms, not their investment 
opportunities. That is, we are concerned with whether or not S&P membership boosts the market 
value of a firm, not the value of its marginal capital investment. We therefore require an estimate 
of Tobin’s average q, not Tobin’s marginal q as estimated, for example, by Durnev et al. (2001).  
We take Tobin’s average q as  












In this section, we describe the construction of the control variables introduced in the 
Empirical Framework section above.     
We define industries dummies using three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes, as provided by Compustat.  Each firm’s industry code is defined as the industry code of 
the segment reporting the largest volume of sales in the relevant year.    
  We take advertising, advt,j, and research and development (R&D) expense, rdj,t, as 
reported in Compustat.
13  If these variables are listed as ‘negligible’, they are set to zero.  If they 
are coded as ‘missing’, we assume they were not disclosed and therefore were judged by the 
auditor to be negligible. 
                                                 
13 Compustat items 45 and 46, respectively.   22
We estimate each firm’s total debt in each year as the sum of the market values of long 
and short-term debts, 
 
[25]  j t ld j t sd j t V V debt , , , , , + =  
 
Non-linear effects on market value associated with firm size are captured by the 
logarithm of the replacement cost of the firm.   
We include industry fixed effects, either directly using three-digit SIC code dummies or 
indirectly by adjusting our average q ratios.  The adjustment is  
[26]  $ ,,


















where firm j is in industry i(t,j) in period t, which industry contains nt,i firms and where qt,i(t,j) is 
the mean average q of all firms in industry i(t,j).  Thus, the adjusted average q is the original 
average q ratio minus the mean of the average q ratios of all other firms in the same industry 
(excluding the firm in question).  If nt,i = 1, the observation is dropped.  This second approach is 
econometrically preferable to simple fixed effects if some industries contain very few firms.   
 
S&P Membership 
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The procedure for classifying firms as S&P member firms is discussed in detail above in the    23
We measure the importance of each firm in the index each year with an S&P 500 Index weight 





j j t cs j t










where Vcs,t,j is the market value of firm j’s common stock at the end of calendar year t.  The 
variable wt,j thus measures the weight of firm j in the value-weighted S&P 500 index in year t.  
For firms not included in S&P500, this weight equals zero by construction.   
 
Assets Indexed to the S&P 500 
  In the Granger-Sims causality tests below, we require an estimate of the amount of 
money invested in passively tracking the S&P 500 Index.  Besides the numerous mutual funds 
indexed to S&P 500, a huge amount of money is informally indexed to the S&P 500 by corporate 
and public sector pension funds.  In addition, many actively managed funds use the S&P 500 as a 
benchmark.  This creates an incentive for their managers to invest money in the S&P index and 
then deviate from that strategy when they feel they have private information.  The result is 
another tier of less formally indexed investment. These considerations make measuring the total 
value of assets indexed to S&P 500 a virtual impossibility.  
  We therefore must employ a proxy variable that is roughly proportional to the value of 
S&P indexed assets.  Our primary proxy for funds indexed to S&P 500 index is the net market 
capitalization of Vanguard 500 index fund, the first index fund.  The Vanguard 500 fund is the 
oldest and largest index fund.  It was established in 1976, and its success led to the establishment 
of numerous other funds.  Thus, in the first years of its existence, the Vanguard 500 is a good   24
proxy for assets indexed to the S&P 500, but in later years, it captures a smaller share of the 
action.  This measure is available from Vanguard Group for the years 1976 through 1997, the last 
year of our data.     
  As an alternative proxy, we employ the total market capitalization of the Vanguard index 
fund family, which includes not only the index funds that track the S&P 500, but also those that 
track other indices.  The advantage of this proxy is that it is more likely to accurately reflect the 
full extent of the growth of indexing in the 1980s and 1990s.  Its disadvantage is that it is not 
confined to S&P 500 funds.   This measure is available from S&P 500 Net Advantage for 1978 
through 1997.  
  Our final proxy for the value of funds indexed to the S&P 500 is the total market value of 
53 selected index funds in United States. This measure is available from Grand Prix Research for 
1978 through 1997.  
 
4.    Findings 
Table 4 displays means of Tobin’s average q ratios, defined as market value per dollar of 
replacement cost or Vtj/Atj, for firms in the S&P 500 index and for various control firm 
subsamples.  The left panel compares index firms with all control firms at least as large as the 
smallest index firm in the relevant year.  The middle panel contrasts index firms with size and 
industry matched non-index firms for each year. The right panel repeats this, but only including 
matched pairs that are close to the same size.  In all three panels, no value premium is evident in 
the early years of our sample window. In the first two panels, the premium is statistically 
insignificant., while in the rightmost panel, a significant value discount associated with index 
membership is apparent in some years.  However, from 1986 on, a statistically significant   25
positive value premium associated with membership in the S&P 500 index is evident.  Moreover, 
this premium grows steadily with time.   
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The t-tests described in Table 4 are standard two-tail t-tests. Substituting Bonforoni t-
tests, which control for difference in the size of the two subsamples being compared, yield a 
similar pattern of statistical significance.   
 
4.1    Regression Results 
We run OLS regression of average Tobin’s average q on S&P 500 membership, 
controlling for three-digit industry fixed effects, R&D spending, advertising spending, leverage 
and firm size, as described in equation 9, for each year from 1978 to 1997. Table 5 presents 
representative regressions for 1978, 1988, and 1997 run on the same three subsamples used in 
Table 4.  Consistent with typical average q regressions, we find significant positive coefficients 
on R&D spending, advertising spending, and leverage, and significant negative coefficients on 
firm size measures.   
   The coefficients of interest in Table 5 are those of the S&P 500 membership dummy, 
which are positive and significant in all three years and in all specifications.  The economically 
important point from Table 5 is that this coefficient is low in 1978, higher in 1988, and much 
higher in 1997 in all specifications.  This indicates an increasing valuation premium associated 
with S&P500 membership through our observation window. 
   26
[Tables 5 and 6 about here] 
 
Table 6 repeats the regressions in Table 5, but substitutes each firm’s weight in the S&P 
500 index for the index membership dummy.  Firms not in the index have an index weight of 
zero.  The weight of a firm in the index is the market value of its equity divided by that of all 500 
firms in the index.    Table 6 thus tests for a relationship between average q and the importance 
of a firm in the index., rather than its mere presence in the index  The coefficients of index 
weight are also positive and significant in all years and specifications, uniformly higher in 1988 
than in 1978, and highest in 1997.   
  The differences in value associated with S&P inclusion are economically as well as 
statistically significant.  For example, regression 5.3 shows that inclusion in the S&P 500 in 1997 
is associated with a 46.6% premium in average q, - substantially larger than the 7.7% premium 
for 1978. Given a 1997 average replacement cost for S&P500 firms of $8 billion, this implies an 
addition to shareholder value of $3.8 billion for the typical index firm, and of about $1.9 trillion 
dollars for all S&P 500 index firms.   
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Table 7 displays the regression coefficients of S&P membership dummies and S&P 
weights in regressions analogous to those in Tables 5 and 6 for all years from 1978 to 1997.  The 
coefficients of control variables are not shown to conserve space and enhance readability.  There 
is a clear and near uniform upward trend in the addition to shareholder value associated with 
S&P index membership and weight.  This is illustrated graphically in Figures 2 and 3.     27
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
We conclude that a large value premium for S&P 500 member firms has developed over 
the past two decades, and that this premium is proportional to the weight of the firm in the S&P 
500 index.   
 
4.2    Regression Robustness Checks 
Reasonable changes in the sample or specification of the regressions we run generate 
qualitatively similar results, by which we mean that the signs, relative magnitudes, and 
significance patterns of the coefficients on S&P membership or weight are similar to those 
shown in the Tables. 
  The results shown contrast index firms with non-index firms larger than the smallest S&P 
500 firm that year.  Using cutoffs of 50% or 25% the size of the smallest S&P 500 firm that year 
generates qualitatively similar results.   
  The regressions shown use data that is Winsorized at the first and 99
th percentiles.   
Winsorizing at the 5
th and 95
th percentiles generates qualitatively similar results.  Alternative 
ways of dealing with outliers include using Cook’s D statistics to delete selected observations, 
deleting “obvious outliers” based on visual inspection of the distribution, and substituting ranks 
for all continuous variables in the regressions.  All three alternative techniques produce 
qualitatively similar results to those shown. 
  The regression variables are normalized by estimated replacement cost.  Any reasonable 
alternative measure of firm size that maintains a fixed proportion with replacement cost can also   28
be used.  Normalizing all variables by sales instead of replacement cost, and using sales to 
measure firm size, generates qualitatively similar results. Normalizing all variables by book 
value results in the same pattern of parameters and significance levels.  
  We use total debt to measure leverage.  Substituting long-term debt generates 
qualitatively similar results.  We use the logarithm of replacement cost to control for size in the 
regressions shown.  Using the dollar value of replacement cost generates qualitatively similar 
findings.   
Our replacement cost estimation technique yields, as a by-product, an estimate of the 
average age of a firm’s physical capital.  Adding the average age of physical capital or its 
logarithm generates qualitatively similar results.   
  We conclude that our finding of a value premium associated with S&P 500 membership 
is highly robust.   
 
The Direction of Causality 
  The regression results described above demonstrate a statistically and economically 
meaningful relationship between membership in the S&P 500 index and an elevated average q 
ratio.  They do not, however, allow us to conclude that index membership ‘causes’ higher 
average q ratios.  Indeed, the causation might run the opposite way.  Standard and Poor’s might 
choose firms with high q ratios for inclusion in its index. 
  However, the event study evidence unambiguously indicates that inclusion in the index 
‘causes’ an immediate share price increase.  Shleifer (1985), Harris and Gurel (1986), Jain 
(1987), Beneish and Whaley (1996) and Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) Dhillon and Johnson   29
(1991), Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2000), and Kaul et al. (2000) all indicate a substantial rise in 
share price upon inclusion in the index.   
  Moreover, the underlying economic story proposed by Shleifer (1985) allows a more 
direct test of causality.  If growing demand for index member firms’ stock is responsible for the 
elevated q ratios we detect, then increases in the amount of money passively tracking the S&P 
500 index should ‘cause’ increases in the regression coefficient associated with index 
membership (or weight) in the sense of Granger (1969) and Sims (1972).   
  Table 9 presents causality tests of the form recommended by Granger and Sims, and 
described in equation [11] above.  These are joint significance tests of the hypothesis that past 
values of xt, the total amount of money invested in S&P 500 index funds, predict the current 
year’s value of β5,t, the coefficient of S&P membership (either the dummy or index weight), after 
controlling for past values of β5,t.   The significance of these F-tests and χ
2-tests can be 
interpreted as evidence that the magnitude of funds tracking the index ‘causes’ increased share 
values in index member firms.   
These tests are run using the S&P value premiums from 1978 to 1997 shown in Table 7 
and the proxies for the amount of money passively tracking the S&P 500 shown in Table 8.  
Note that the first index fund, the Vanguard 500 was founded in 1976.  Our window thus 
stretches back almost to the beginning of indexing.  
In general, the Granger-Sims tests are more consistent with indexing causing the value 
premium than with the converse.  Nineteen of the thirty six tests of indexing causing the 
premium are statistically significant at 10% confidence levels; whereas, only five of the thirty six 
tests of reverse causality are significant.  While the incidence of statistical significance in the   30
direct causality tests (53%) is much higher than that expected through type two errors (10%), the 
incidence of significant reverse causality (14%) is only slightly higher.  
Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that the increasing amount of money 
passively tracking the S&P 500 Index “causes” the valuation premium associated with index 
membership and with a member firm’s weight in the index    
 
Causality Test Robustness Checks 
The  χ
2 and F tests in Table 9 are all run using S&P membership or index weight 
coefficients from regressions run on the sample of firms at least as large (in terms of replacement 
cost), as the smallest S&P 500 firm in each year in question.  When using regression coefficients 
estimated either across all available data or across firms larger than half the size of the smallest 
S&P 500 firms, The tests in Table 9 are based on runs using two lags of the S&P membership or 
weight coefficient and two lags of the value of funds under indexing. When we allow the data to 
select the number of lags, the results are similar to those shown in Table 9.
14  
In summary, our finding that the amount of money passively tracking the S&P 500 Index 
‘causes’ the valuation premium associated with S&P 500 membership in the sense of Granger 
(1969) and Sims (1972) appears to be quite robust.   
 
                                                 
14 Reverse causation not evident in any specification when firms smaller than half the size of the 
smallest index firm are included.  When the data selects the number of lags, reverse causation is 
rejected in all specifications involving the coefficient on the membership dummy.  When the 
regression coefficient is that of the index weight, causality appears to run in both directions.     31
Conclusions 
This paper documents a large value premium in the average q ratios of firms in the S&P 
500 index relative to the q ratios of other similar firms.  This premium appears a few years after 
the founding of the first S&P 500 index fund, and grows steadily and in step with the growth of 
indexing. 
One interpretation of this finding is that a mysterious intangible asset is connected with 
membership in the S&P 500 index, and that the value of this asset has grown in synch with the 
growth of indexing.   
 A second interpretation is that the value premium is due to indexing directly.  Because 
index fund managers are penalized for tracking error, they must hold the stocks in the index they 
are tracking. Indexing can also be accomplished with derivatives, but many institutional 
investors and mutual funds bind themselves from using derivatives, so they must hold the index 
stocks.   Firms in the index thus do not have close substitutes insofar as far as these index fund 
managers are concerned.  Consequently, index member firms’ stocks may have downward 
sloping demand curves.   
This is easy to see in reductio ad absurdum. If the amount of money indexed to the S&P 
500 grows without bound, index funds will come to buy and hold virtually all the shares in the 
firms in the index. Obviously, if still more money is pumped into index funds, investors 
squatting on the last few shares of each index member firm can demand exorbitant prices.  The 
downward sloping demand curves story is basically that this economic logic sets in when index 
funds’ stakes are still moderate because arbitrageurs do not correct valuation gaps between index 
firms and non-index firms with similar risks and expected payouts.  Shleifer (2000) attributes 
this to costly arbitrage.      32
Shleifer (1985) presents evidence that S&P 500 member firms’ stocks have downward 
sloping demand curves, and a series of subsequent papers debated this conclusion.  Recent 
studies, particularly Kaul et al. (2000) and Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2000) strongly support 
Shleifer’s original interpretation of his results.  Demand curves for stocks, or more precisely, 
demand curves for stocks in indexes, do indeed appear to slope downwards.   
 Since the Efficient Markets Hypothesis holds that active managers cannot outperform 
indexes on a risk-adjusted basis, financial economists usually recommend investing in index 
funds to achieve a widely diversified portfolio while minimizing management fees and avoiding 
direct trading costs.  This advice has proven itself, as managed investment funds have indeed 
largely failed to consistently beat the S&P500 benchmark return.  Consequently, more investors 
adopt indexing.    
  The second interpretation of our findings suggests that this upward spiral in demand for 
index stocks itself pushed up their prices.  This view is consistent with Masso and Goetzman 
(1999), who find that the S&P index return to be positively correlated with net inflows into index 
funds.  
  Ironically, if this interpretation of our findings is correct, the investment advice implied 
by the Efficient Markets Hypothesis may itself be undermining the efficiency of the stock 
market.  In an “indexing bubble”, index stock prices spiral upward due to rising demand from 
index funds due to the superior past performance of indexing, which is due to the upward spiral 
of index stock prices, which ….  .  This second interpretation of our findings is consistent with 
the view that such an indexing bubble occurred in US stock markets.   
A possible response to this development is for firms whose stocks are included in widely 
followed indexes, and consequently overvalued, to issue additional shares and use the funds so   33
raised to acquire productive assets or to acquire firms not in widely-followed indexes.  In other 
words, indexing may cause economically inefficient over-investment by index member firms and 
economically inefficient M&A activity.  In our view, this response is undesirable from a public 
policy perspective.   
A second response is to encouraging indexing using derivative securities and to 
discourage indexing accomplished by actually buying the stocks in the index.  Given recent 
scandals associated with derivative securities, and the consequent determination of many plan 
sponsors and investors to avoid them, this option may not be realistic.   
  A third response, which we advocate, is that passive investment benchmarks should be 
reevaluated.    If a total market index, such as the CRSP value-weighted total return, were the 
benchmark against which passive funds were judged, there would be no disproportionate demand 
for the shares of the relatively few firms in a narrow and arbitrarily defined index like the S&P 
500.  Passive investment funds could buy and hold diversified portfolios of randomly selected 
stocks, rather than all investing in the same 500 stocks.  This holistic indexing would have the 
salubrious effect of spreading passive demand for stocks across the market more evenly, thereby 
avoiding price distortions of the sort described above.     34
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Table 1 



































sample  I C  I1 
a  M1  I2  M2  I  U C 
1978  419  1,585  419 415 224 224  2,004 
1979  420  1,781  420 417 216 216  2,201 
1980  416  2,323  416 411 210 210  2,739 
1981  420  2,114  420 412 200 200  2,534 
1982  420  1,282  420 410 190 190  1,702 
1983  409  1,368  409 399 185 185  1,777 
1984  411  2,043  411 403 199 199  2,454 
1985  408  1,538  408 400 197 197  1,946 
1986  407  1,705  407 399 220 220  2,112 
1987  413  1,640  413 406 218 218  2,053 
1988  404  3,603  404 398 216 216  4,007 
1989  404  3,477  404 398 200 200  3,881 
1990  401  3,041  401 391 209 209  3,442 
1991  404  2,287  404 394 207 207  2,691 
1992  407  1,924  407 400 218 218  2,331 
1993  409  2,164  409 405 237 237  2,573 
1994  405  1,485  405 405 236 236  1,890 
1995  394  1,672  394 394 229 229  2,066 
1996  391  1,904  391 391 229 229  2,295 
1997  390  1,486  390 390 233 233  1,876 
a.  The index firm samples I and I1 are identical.  38
Table 2 
Univariate Statistics for Main Regression Variables  
Firms are indexed by j and time by t.  Average Tobin’s q is estimated market value, Vt,j, 
over estimated replacement cost, At,j.  Research and development (R&D) spending and 
advertising spending are expressed as fractions of replacement cost.  Leverage is the 
estimated market value of short and long-term debt over replacement cost, and firm size is 
the logarithm of replacement cost.   
 










Dependent Variable   







  1.31  0.95 0.22  0.32 1.05  5.47 7.63 
Control Variables              























  0.28  0.26 0.00  0.00 0.22  1.31 1.83 
Firm size  ) ln( , j t A   6.04  1.74 1.97  2.31 5.86  10.18  10.84 
Index Membership Variables            
S&P 500 Indicator  j t, η   0.17  0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Weight in S&P 500  j t w ,   0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 
Sample is full sample described in Table 1 (I U C), all years combined.   39
Table 3 
Inventory Valuation 
Conventions for marking inventories to market for firms that use more than one 
inventory accounting method 
 
Number of inventory 
accounting methods used 
Rank in importance of LIFO 
accounting 
Assumed fraction of 
inventories subject to LIFO 
2 1  66.7 
2 2  33.3 
3 1  50.0 
3 2  33.3 
3 3  16.7 
   40
Table 4. 
The Value Premium Associated with Being in the S&P500 Index  
Mean Tobin’s average q ratios for firms in the S&P 500 index and various control firm subsamples.   
 
 
Firms as large as  
smallest S&P firm  
Size and Industry Matched 
 Pairs Control Group 
Very Close Matched  


























sample  I C    I1  M1     I2  M2    
1978  0.777 0.776 0.001 0.97  0.786 0.737 0.049  0.07  0.821 0.718 0.103  0.01 
1979  0.777 0.831 -0.054  0.02  0.787 0.757 0.030  0.28  0.808 0.737 0.071  0.08 
1980  0.838 0.991 -0.153  0.00  0.842 0.884 -0.042 0.50  0.918 0.741 0.177  0.00 
1981  0.736 0.831 -0.096  0.00  0.736 0.778 -0.042 0.26  0.780 0.688 0.093  0.04 
1982  0.826 0.797 0.030 0.33  0.840 0.841 -0.001 0.99  0.914 0.789 0.125  0.06 
1983  0.959 0.990 -0.031  0.39  0.967 1.015 -0.048 0.36  1.045 0.916 0.129  0.07 
1984  0.979 1.040 -0.061  0.08  0.981 0.937 0.044  0.31  1.076 0.879 0.196  0.00 
1985  1.168 1.141 0.027 0.47  1.176 1.144 0.032  0.55  1.290 1.011 0.280  0.00 
1986  1.323 1.244 0.079 0.06  1.354 1.235 0.119  0.07  1.451 1.133 0.318  0.00 
1987  1.320 1.174 0.146 0.00  1.331 1.226 0.104  0.09  1.376 1.197 0.180  0.05 
1988  1.344 1.414 -0.070  0.07  1.344 1.207 0.137  0.00  1.413 1.195 0.218  0.00 
1989  1.530 1.510 0.020 0.69  1.533 1.287 0.246  0.00  1.627 1.314 0.313  0.00 
1990  1.379 1.262 0.117 0.01  1.383 1.199 0.185  0.00  1.465 1.246 0.219  0.01 
1991  1.642 1.564 0.078 0.25  1.678 1.462 0.215  0.03  1.756 1.464 0.292  0.05 
1992  1.654 1.601 0.052 0.37  1.663 1.450 0.213  0.01  1.693 1.336 0.357  0.00 
1993  1.707 1.784 -0.078  0.16  1.728 1.632 0.096  0.24  1.765 1.599 0.166  0.14 
1994  1.626 1.540 0.086 0.09  1.650 1.473 0.177  0.01  1.699 1.450 0.249  0.01 
1995  1.899 1.704 0.195 0.00  1.938 1.629 0.309  0.00  2.023 1.588 0.435  0.00 
1996  1.995 1.764 0.232 0.00  2.046 1.728 0.319  0.00  2.063 1.694 0.370  0.00 
1997  2.297 1.806 0.491 0.00  2.350 1.822 0.527  0.00  2.323 1.714 0.610  0.00   41
Table 5 
Regressions of Average Tobin’s Q On a Dummy Indicating S&P 500 Membership 
Controls are 3-digit industry fixed effects, R&D spending, advertising spending, leverage, and firm size.  Data are for 1978, 1988, and 
1997.  Regressions 5.1, 5.4, and 5.7 use 1978 data, regressions; 5.2, 5.5, and 5.8 use 1988 data, and regressions 5.3, 5.6, and 5.9 
use 1997 data. Average Tobin’s q is estimated market value, Vt,j, over estimated replacement cost, At,j.  Research and development 
(R&D) spending and advertising spending are expressed as fractions of replacement cost.  Leverage is the estimated market value 
of short and long-term debt over replacement cost, and firm size is the logarithm of replacement cost.  S&P membership dummy is 
one for firms in the index that year and zero otherwise.  
    5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 
 
  Index firms and control firms at least 
as large as  smallest index firm 
Size and Industry Matched 
 Pairs  
Very Close Size and Industry 
Matched Pairs  
Year    1978 1988 1997 1978 1988 1997 1978 1988 1997 
0.077 0.205 0.466 0.096 0.174 0.466 0.096 0.172 0.540  S&P 
membership 
dummy 
j t, η   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 








  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 








  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  0.01  (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) 








  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  0.04  (0.00) (0.12) (0.01) (0.04) (0.12) 
-0.043 -0.067 -0.117 -0.067 -0.081 -0.041 -0.090 -0.103 -0.014   
Firm size 
 
) ln( , j t A   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.50 (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.85) 
5.7  5.7 5.1 4.3 3.9 3.2 3.4 3.1 3.3  Regression F 
statistic  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
R-squared  0.41 0.27 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.39 0.49 0.45 0.44 
Sample
c   I U C  I U C  I U C  I1 U M1  I1 U M1  I1 U M1  I2 U M2  I2 U M2  I2 U M2 
a.  Data are winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles. 
b.  Firm size is measured by replacement cost of assets, At,j. 
c.    Sample sizes are as described in Table 1 
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Table 6 
Regressions of Average Tobin’s Q On S&P 500 Index Weight 
Controls are 3-digit industry fixed effects, R&D spending, advertising spending, leverage, and firm size.  Data are for 1978, 1988, and 1997.  
Regressions 6.1, 6.4, and 6.7 use 1978 data, regressions; 6.2, 6.5, and 6.8 use 1988 data, and regressions 6.3, 6.6, and 6.9 use 1997 data. 
Average Tobin’s q is estimated market value, Vt,j, over estimated replacement cost, At,j.  Research and development (R&D) spending and 
advertising spending are expressed as fractions of replacement cost.  Leverage is the estimated market value of short and long-term debt over 
replacement cost, and firm size is the logarithm of replacement cost.  S&P index weight is the market value of the firm’s equity divided by the total 
market value of the equity of all index firms, and is zero for non-index firms. 
    6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 
    Index firms and control firms at least 
as large as  smallest index firm 
Size and Industry Matched 
 Pairs  
Very Close Size and Industry 
Matched Pairs  
Year    1978 1988 1997 1978 1988 1997 1978 1988 1997 
0.141 0.246 1.715 0.179 0.264 2.233 0.441 0.366 2.914  S&P index 
weight  j t w ,  
(0.00) 0.05  0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) 








(0.00) (0.00)  0.00  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 









(0.00) (0.00)  0.08  (0.00) (0.00) 0.09 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.66) 








(0.00) (0.00)  0.00  0.03  (0.00) 0.34 (0.00)  (0.12)  (0.24) 
-0.038 -0.054 -0.141 -0.067 -0.071 -0.190 -0.104 -0.111 -0.336   
Firm size 
 
) ln( , j t A  
(0.00) (0.00)  0.00  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
5.8 5.7 5.8  4.00  3.8 4.2 3.5 3.0 5.3  Regression F  
statistic  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  0.00  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
R-squared 0.41  0.27  0.44  0.44 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.44 0.57 
Sample size  I U C  I U C  I U C  I1 U M1  I1 U M1  I1 U M1  I2 U M2  I2 U M2  I2 U M2 
a.  Data are winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles. 
b.  Firm size is measured by replacement cost of assets, At,j. 
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Table 7 
How Regression Coefficients on Dummy Indicating S&P 500 Membership or on Index Weight Changed Over Time  
Dependent variable is average q ratio, estimated market value, Vt,j, over estimated replacement cost, At,j..  Controls include 3-digit industry fixed 
effects, R&D spending, advertising spending, leverage, and firm size.  Research and development (R&D) spending and advertising spending are 
expressed as fractions of replacement cost.  Leverage is the estimated market value of short and long-term debt over replacement cost, and firm 
size is the logarithm of replacement cost.  S&P index weight is the market value of the firm’s equity divided by the total market value of the equity 
of all index firms, and is zero for non-index firms.  S&P membership dummy is one for firms in the index that year and zero otherwise.  
 
  Coefficient on S&P 500 membership dummy  Coefficient on weight in S&P 500 Index 
sample  I U C  I1 U M1  I2 U M2  I U C  I1 U M1  I2 U M2 
Year  β5,t 
Prob. 
β5,t = 0  β5,t 
Prob. 
β5,t = 0  β5,t 
Prob. 
β5,t = 0  β5,t 
Prob. 
β5,t = 0 β5,t 
Prob. 
β5,t = 0 β5,t 
Prob. 
β5,t = 0
1978  0.077  0.00 0.096 0.00 0.096 0.00  0.141 0.00 0.179 0.00 0.441 0.00 
1979  0.070  0.00 0.077 0.00 0.070 0.02  0.104 0.01 0.166 0.00 0.228 0.02 
1980  0.131  0.00 0.269 0.00 0.172 0.00  0.192 0.02 0.509 0.00 0.367 0.00 
1981  0.056  0.09 0.082 0.02 0.103 0.00  0.174 0.02 0.295 0.00 0.401 0.00 
1982  0.099  0.00 0.168 0.00 0.144 0.01  0.206 0.00 0.301 0.00 0.690 0.00 
1983  0.091  0.01  0.157  0.00  0.146  0.01  0.231  0.00  0.355  0.00  0.612  0.00 
1984  0.151  0.00  0.170  0.00  0.186  0.00  0.163  0.01  0.192  0.00  0.539  0.01 
1985  0.190  0.00  0.234  0.00  0.269  0.00  0.184  0.01  0.279  0.00  0.687  0.01 
1986  0.223  0.00  0.309  0.00  0.345  0.00  0.275  0.00  0.440  0.00  0.816  0.00 
1987  0.242  0.00  0.211  0.00  0.146  0.07  0.287  0.00  0.322  0.01  0.384  0.13 
1988  0.205  0.00 0.174 0.00 0.172 0.00  0.246 0.05 0.264 0.01 0.366 0.05 
1989  0.308  0.00 0.330 0.00 0.301 0.00  0.423 0.01 0.484 0.00 0.526 0.02 
1990  0.222  0.00 0.233 0.00 0.185 0.02  0.455 0.00 0.521 0.00 0.659 0.00 
1991  0.259  0.00 0.324 0.00 0.244 0.06  0.833 0.00 1.091 0.00 1.099 0.00 
1992  0.242  0.00 0.367 0.00 0.393 0.00  0.865 0.00 1.178 0.00 1.206 0.00 
1993  0.200  0.00  0.246  0.00  0.212  0.03  0.701  0.00  1.047  0.00  1.505  0.00 
1994  0.233  0.00  0.263  0.00  0.237  0.00  0.809  0.00  1.016  0.00  1.400  0.00 
1995  0.349  0.00  0.413  0.00  0.352  0.00  1.247  0.00  1.771  0.00  1.816  0.00 
1996  0.295  0.00  0.322  0.00  0.261  0.02  1.315  0.00  2.068  0.00  2.264  0.00 
1997  0.466  0.00  0.466  0.00  0.540  0.00  1.715  0.00  2.233  0.00  2.914  0.00 
Samples for each year are as described in Table 1.  Regressions are identical to those shown in full in Tables 5 and 6.  
a.  Data are winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles.  
b.  Firms at least half as large, in terms of replacement cost of assets, At,j, as the smallest S&P500 firm in the same year.  
c.  Firms at least as large, in terms of replacement cost of assets, At,j, as the smallest S&P500 firm in the same year.
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Table 8 
Total Value of S&P 500 Indexed Mutual Fund Assets 









Value of 53  
Index funds 







Value of 53  
Index funds 
b 
1978 0.09  0.09
  8.32 1988 0.87 0.92  160.38 
1979 0.10  0.10
  8.84 1989 1.44 1.58  208.56 
1980 0.11  0.11
  10.31 1990  1.66  2.23 208.29 
1981  0.10 0.10 n.a. 1991 3.22 4.38  265.85 
1982  0.11 0.12  16.10  1992 4.75 6.70  294.26 
1983  0.22 0.22  23.44  1993 5.84 9.57  322.73 
1984 0.27  0.30  41.87  1994  6.47  10.63  297.25 
1985 0.35  0.39  60.00  1995  11.77  19.56  407.36 
1986 0.43  0.45  92.47  1996  20.17  33.86  550.97 
1987 0.71  0.73  134.19  1997  32.29  55.53  726.98 
Source: S&P Net Advantage, Vanguard and Grand Prix Fund Research 
a.  Vanguard Group and S&P net advantage. 
b.  We substitute the value of the Vanguard 500 for missing value in the first four years. 
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TABLE 9 
Granger’s Causality Tests  





assets in index funds 
Subsample used to 
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Figure 1 
A Downward Sloping Demand Curve For a Stock 
If stocks have downward sloping demand curves, their prices reflect the interplay 
of supply and demand, like the prices of other economic goods.  If a stock is 
added to a widely-tracked index, this shifts its demand curve to the right, from D0 
to D1, and thereby increases the stock’s price from P0 to P1.  For simplicity, and 
without loss of generality for the topic at hand, we represent the supply curve, S, 
for the stock as a vertical line.  In practice, firms might issue more stock as their 
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Figure 2 
The Value of the Vanguard 500 Index Fund and the Tobin’s Average Q Premium Associated with Membership in 































































The value of the Vanguard 500 Fund is in billions of 1982 dollars on the left-hand scale, while the valuation effects (coefficients on S&P 500 




Premium, estimated using control firms 
Premium, estimated using matched pairs 
Premium, estimated using close pairs 
Indexed assets   48
Figure 3 
The Value of the Vanguard 500 Index Fund and the Tobin’s Average Q Premium Associated with Weight in the 
































































The value of the Vanguard 500 Fund is in billions of 1982 dollars on the left-hand scale, while the valuation effects (coefficients on S&P 500 index 
weights from table 7) are plotted against the right-hand scale.   Samples used in estimating the valuation effects are as described in Table 1.  





Premium, estimated using control firms 
Premium, estimated using matched pairs 
Premium, estimated using close pairs 
Indexed assets  
0 
Appendix Table 1 
Assumed age structure of corporate debt in 1958 
 
Age in years  Fraction of debt 
19 0.020 
18 0.038 
17 0.038 
16 0.039 
15 0.047 
14 0.038 
13 0.038 
12 0.044 
11 0.060 
10 0.056 
9 0.058 
8 0.058 
7 0.063 
6 0.079 
5 0.076 
4 0.033 
3 0.059 
2 0.067 
1 0.086 
 
 
 
 
 